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It is widely agreed that the vast majority of convictions in
criminal courts are the result of guilty pleas. There is also
surprisingly little disagreement that most guilty pleas are a
consequence of plea bargaining, of one form or another
Uncritical acceptance of the notion that guilty pleas are
synonymous with bargaining has had several negative results
One of the most significant is that researchers overlook the
outlines of two very different conceptions of the guilty plea
process in answering the question: What makes the plea
system work?
While most observers agree some form of trial penalty
exists to encourage pleas (i.e., a more severe sentence will
be given to defendants who are convicted after trial), they
differ over how pleas are put together. These differences form
the basis for two competing models. One could be termed
the "concessions" model. Adherents of this model are nor-
mally vociferous critics of plea bargaining. Although they span
the ideological spectrum, they are in general agreement that
charging manipulations and sentencing concessions grease
the wheels of justice. The other is the "consensus" model,
which stresses the importance of shared understandings in
lubricating the court's machinery. Concessions and explicit
bargaining have a role to play, but they are restricted to a
small subset of cases involving lengthy sentences, evidentiary
deficiencies, or some other type of problem.
How two such different models of the guilty plea process
could co-exist without attracting more comment can best be
explained by reference to the tale of the blind men and the
elephant Depending upon their research technique and de-
sign, the type and location of court studied, ideological
orientation, etc., plea bargaining researchers left their field
sites with different perceptions of the guilty plea process
This suggests two observations. First, the two models are
not mutually exclusive in the sense that all guilty pleas in a
court operations become quite evident. For example, to what
extent do charge modifications characterize the guilty plea
process9 What is the nature of these modifications9 What is
the nature of sentencing patterns in plea cases, i.e., are
sentences for a given offense characterized by wide disparities
or narrow similarities9 Answers to these important questions
will provide insights into the nature of the guilty plea process
and the ability of the competing models to portray it.
Looking only at the implications of the two models for the
structure of the guilty plea process, two issues become
apparent (see Figure 1). One is the role of charge reductions.
Regardless of any other concessions, these are important
because they can limit the defendant's legal liability at
sentencing The second issue concerns the role of what some
term the
"going rate," the normal range of sentences for a
particular type of offense, which is largely based upon the
historical practice within a given county. It is similar to the
price of milk in a supermarket. While the price will vary in
different parts of the country, consumers in any single area
expect the price for a gallon of milk to be within a given
range.
Figure 1 suggests that in a pure concessions model bar-
gaining over guilty pleas will involve substantial revisions in
the original legal exposure of defendants as counts are
dropped and charges are reduced to satisfy the interests
and goals of participants. Sentences will vary considerably
not only because the participants change from one case to
another but also because the negotiating skills and resources
of the actors will vary and be largely unrestrained by prece-
dent. Modified versions of the concessions model would
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as far as they went A second instructive observation is that
plea bargaining researchers too often have failed to document
their field perceptions empirically The perceptions became,
in effect, covenants of faith Moreover no one rigorously
examined their role in the guilty plea process.
Once these covenants of faith are acknowledged for what
they are — hypotheses about the very essence of the guilty
plea process — gaping holes in empirical research on criminal
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wheels of justice This argument would be greatly
,/G* Figure 1
EMPIRICAL DIMENSIONS OF GUILTY PLEA PROCESS
Influence of Going Rates
Legal Exposure
strengthened if there were also empirical evidence of wide
ranging sentencing disparities (for the early, "untainted"
charges) Without such evidence the charge manipulations
would be vulnerable to the accusation that they are wholly
symbolic, made only to mollify defendants, -and that defend-
ants are being duped
In contrast to the various versions of the concessions
model, the consensus model predicts high levels of consist-
ency on both dimensions Charge and count modifications
will be relatively infrequent, and there will be minimal variation
in sentences for comparable cases and circumstances. If
charging modifications are in fact infrequent, it would seem
reasonable to conclude that common understandings and
perceptions among court participants underlie the process
and that participants are chiefly concerned with pigeonholing
defendants, not with negotiating over relative advantages It
follows that if there is charging consistency there must also
be sentencing consistency Otherwise, it could be argued
that beneath the placid surface of charge constancy a lively
trade in guilty pleas is being conducted — with sentences
as currency
DATA SOURCES
To examine the level of charging and sentencing disparities,
data from a broadly-based, intensive study of criminal courts
in nine medium-sized counties (with populations ranging from
100,000 to 1,000,000) in Illinois, Michigan, and Pennsylvania
were examined The Illinois counties were DuPage, Peoria,
and St, Clair, the Michigan counties were Oakland, Kalamazoo,
and Saginaw; the Pennsylvania counties were Montgomery,
Dauphin, and Erie
The nine counties were selected to gauge the impact of
two important county differences on criminal court operations:
socioeconomic welfare and political attitudes To fulfill these
criteria, one economically declining county (St, Clair, Saginaw,
Erie), one autonomous county (Peoria, Kalamazoo, Dauphin),
and one suburban ring county (DuPage, Oakland, Montgo-
mery) was selected from each state.
It will be useful to describe some of the differences in the
sites to demonstrate that the data do not represent any
single, narrow slice of middle America. Table 1 reports the
economic and political characteristics of the nine counties
The ring counties were the most prosperous — with per capita
incomes hovering at about $10,000 in 1979 The declining
counties were far less prosperous; per capita incomes stood
at somewhat over $6,500 Politically, DuPage and Dauphin
counties appear to be the most conservative, followed by
Peoria and Montgomery counties The Michigan counties
appear to be fairly moderate, while St. Clair and Erie counties
are moderately liberal
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The nine counties also showed some important differences
in crime rates. According to the FBI reports on violent personal
crime rates (per 100,000 population) for the ten years pre-
ceding this study (1971-80), Peoria and St. Clair counties had
the highest rates, Kalamazoo and Dauphin counties were far
lower. While two Michigan counties (Oakland and Saginaw)
had fairly low personal offense rates, two of the ring counties
(DuPage and Montgomery) and Erie had the lowest.
It is obvious that these counties differ markedly even though
they are all midsized American communities. Indeed, they
were selected because of their differences. No claim is made
that the criminal courts of these counties are in any way a
representative sample. They are not. However, their diversity
helps undercut the types of biases that often creep into
findings based on only one or two locales.
In these nine counties extensive case data on almost 7,500
felony defendants were collected. The number of defendants
ranged from 1,162 in St Clair County to 594 in Erie County.
They represent roughly a year's cases in each county; the
nine sets of cases, on balance, reflect about nine years of
dispositions. Most were disposed of during 1979 and 1980.
In most counties all cases for a given time span were included
in the sample. However, in some counties systematic samples
were used. In addition, 300 interviews were conducted with
the judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys who handled
the cases.
One last point should be made. For the purposes of this
paper the analysis rests on a merged pool of the county
samples since the primary interest was in painting a broad
picture The fusion of data from a variety of different jurisdic-
tions insures that this picture will be fairly balanced.
CHARGING MODIFICATIONS AND GUILTY PLEAS
The modification of charges pending against a defendant can
have an important effect upon the decision to plead guilty
because it limits his potential exposure to legal sanctions.
This exposure depends upon the severity and range of
penalties associated with the charges lodged against him
upon which he could be convicted and sentenced after a
trial While the going rate for an offense normally limits the
probable range of sentences, its outermost boundaries are
still set by statute Modifying charges can, therefore, change
potential exposure in ways that are either positive or negative
for the defendant. Because of the differences in potential and
probable sentences — and the possibility that some charge
reductions may be largely symbolic — the analysis of charge
reduction is relatively involved and multifaceted First, we will
look at the incidence and pattern of charge modifications.
Second, we will measure the magnitude of these changes
Frequency and Focus of Charge Modifications
Four empirical patterns of charge modification were found in
guilty plea cases: (1) no changes in charges, (2) a "pure"
reduction in the number of counts or seriousness of offenses,
(3) a "mixed" modification, with an enhancement of counts
or charge seriousness later followed by a reduction; and (4)
a straightforward enhancement in exposure through increases
in the number of counts of charge seriousness. Diagram 1
reports the frequency of these patterns.
Complete consistency — no modifications in any count or
charge from the time of arrest through final disposition
—
occurred in 60 percent of the cases "Pure" reductions were
made in over a quarter of the cases (26 7 percent) Enhance-
ments took place in roughly 13 percent of the cases, but the
lion's share of these were "mixed" cases: 71 percent of the
enhancements were later mitigated through reductions Charge

enhancements normally took place when the indictment or
information was filed, reductions were made later on in trial
court. Comparisons of the arrest and conviction charges show
that this two-step process produced real reductions, and they
should, therefore, be combined with the "pure" category to
gain an accurate picture of concessions
Together the two groups accounted for 36 percent of the
entire pooled sample of cases, at first glance a rather sizable
proportion This should be qualified by the observation that
the concessions usually focused on secondary or tertiary
offenses, not the primary or most serious charge. For example,
68 4 percent of the "pure" reductions entailed alterations in
these secondary charges. For the "mixed" cases, the pro-
portion was 50 1 percent. Altogether only about 15 percent
of the cases involved a reduction in the primary offense. As
a final matter, it bears mentioning that the number of true
enhancements amounted to only 210 cases, or slightly less
than 4 percent of the pooled sample. For this reason the
following discussion generally concentrates on charge reduc-
tions.
Depending upon one's views these data show either too
much charging manipulation or too little (i.e., the reductions
of secondary offenses are insignificant and wholly symbolic,
resulting in the deception of most defendants). While such
an assessment is premature at this point, we cannot even
begin to address such issues without comparing charge
changes in guilty plea cases with those in trial convictions
Some adjustments are bound to occur in a process as complex
as the criminal justice system Hence, a certain level of charge
reductions may not be unique to plea cases but simply
inevitable within the dispositional process. Table 2 reports
data on the incidence of a charge reduction by mode of
conviction
In general, charge modifications were neither ubiquitous in
guilty plea cases nor rare in trial convictions Reductions were
significantly more likely (statistically speaking) in guilty plea
cases than in the trial cases But it also is quite evident that
charge modifications were not unknown in trial convictions,
due to dismissal or the acquittal of certain counts Reductions
were made in 30 percent of the trial cases, a figure not greatly
dissimilar from that for guilty pleas (38 4 percent). The differ-
ences narrow when focusing on reductions of the primary
charge; 10.9 percent of the convictions in trial cases were
for reduced primary charges compared to 15.1 percent of
the guilty pleas.
The fundamental similarity in the charge reduction patterns
of guilty plea and trial cases introduces a certain element of
ambiguity to the data reported in Diagram 1. The fact that
yawning gaps do not appear by mode of conviction suggests
that at least some of the charging concessions (which sup-
posedly limit a defendant's legal exposure at sentencing)
might have occurred even if a plea had not been submitted.
Table 2
INCIDENCE OF A CHARGE REDUCTION BY MODE OF
CONVICTION
Guilty Plea Trial Conviction
Any Charge
Reduction
Reduction of
Primary Offense
38.4%"
(5462)
15.1%*
(5564)
30%"
(370)
10 9%*
(387)
An examination of the magnitude of these concessions may
erase some of this ambiguity.
Magnitude of Charge Reductions
Modifications in defendants' potential legal exposure occurred
roughly one-third of the time and most often involved only
the secondary charges, leaving the primary charges un-
touched. Could these changes be largely symbolic? Or were
they real concessions7 To shed light on whether the reductions
were meaningful or not, two measures of magnitude were
used. The first was the number of counts dropped The other
was more refined and measured the change in probable or
projected sentences due to charge reductions.
Count Drops
The most common form of charge concession in guilty plea
cases was the dismissal of one or more counts in a multi-
count indictment or information. Such drops occurred in 29.9
percent of the cases, as can be seen in Table 3. The average
number of counts dropped (for the cases where a count drop
occurred) ranged between 1 and 2 (mean = 1 .7, median =
1.3). The counts dropped accounted for half of the counts
charged (mean proportion of all counts dropped = .55, median
=
.50). Count drops occurred in only 23.1 percent of trial
convictions, but the mean number dropped was 2.0 (median
=
1.6), somewhat larger than the mean in guilty plea cases.
Both statistics are significantly different from those in guilty
plea cases, but substantively the differences are not very
meaningful.
Projected Sentence
The analysis of count modifications is not totally satisfactory
because it is crude and does not say much about their
substantive significance. Its crudeness is due to the fact that
it equates the dropping of a theft charge with a rape charge,
and it misses cases involving only charge modifications
unaccompanied by count modifications (e.g., reducing aggra-
vated battery to simply battery). Also, the count analysis
lacks strong substantive implications because the conse-
quences of count modifications for any realistic assessment
of a defendant's projected sentence are uncertain Dropping
the third and fourth counts of a "string" indictment may have
little or no impact on the actual sentence
To examine the magnitude of charge modifications, an
"offense seriousness score" was constructed. It measures
the differences between the original mix of charges and the
final set. These offense seriousness scores are equivalent to
the average sentence received in a county for a particular
Table 3
COUNT REDUCTIONS BY TYPE OF CONVICTION
Average number
Percent of of counts
all cases dropped
Average counts
dropped as a
proportion of
counts charged
•
Significant at 05 level
"
Significant at 001 level
Table 4
WEIGHTED CHARGE REDUCTIONS BY TYPE OF CONVICTION
Charge Reduction:
Guilty Pleas
Trial Convictions
Note N S = Statistically not significant
Percent of
all cases
23.9NS
(965)
22.0NS
(62)
Average weighted
modification
(in months)
Mean Median
7.6NS 14
11.6NS 1 1
Percentage of all
weighted changes
that are less than
six months
79
79
Average weighted
modifications as
a proportion of
weighted charges
Mean
,39NS
.40NS
Median
24
.35
offense For example, if the average armed robbery sentence
was 48.6 months, then the offense seriousness score would
be 48.6 These scores were highly correlated (r = .70) with
the actual sentences, as one would guess, and gives us a
good basis for estimating the impact of a charge reduction
on a defendant's sentence. If a reduction is from an offense
with an average sentence of 16.4 months to one with an
average sentence of 12.4 months, we can project that the
reduction is "worth" about 4 months at the sentencing state
'
Table 4 reports data on the changes in weighted serious-
ness scores between arrest and conviction. Almost a quarter
of the guilty plea cases in this subset of most frequent
offenses received a reduction in one of the first three arrest
offenses. The mean projected sentencing value of these
reductions was 7 6 months, but that figure is highly skewed
by a handful of extreme cases. As the median value of 1.4
months indicates, half of those pleading guilty had charge
reductions "worth" somewhat less than two months in proj-
ected sentence. Almost 80 percent of the defendants received
reductions under six months.
Another way to view this is that, of all defendants who
pleaded guilty, only about 5 percent received a charge
concession likely to be "worth" at least six months. It should
be remembered that the absolute level of charge reductions
is limited by the projected sentence of the total package of
charges. Thus it is important to note that the last two columns
in Table 4 report the reductions as proportions of the summed
seriousness scores. The mean value of these proportions is
.39, and the median is .24. According to the median figure,
then, the projected sentences of half of the defendants who
pleaded guilty and received some form of charge reduction
was cut by a quarter.
While these proportions seem fairly significant, it should be
kept in mind that they represent less than one quarter of all
guilty plea cases. Moreover, if these statistics, as well as the
others reported in Table 4 are compared with the attrition of
charges in trial cases (row 2), it is not at all clear that the
charge reductions which do occur are real concessions. There
' The existence of multi-count indictments compounded the difficulties of
analysis somewhat because the impact on sentencing of a charge when it is
listed as a second or third count on an indictment is not nearly as great as
when it is the most serious count charged To handle this problem, the average
impact of second and third counts was estimated These estimates were used
to weight the impact of the second and third counts Thus in the case of
multi-count indictments, the offense seriousness score is a weighted, summed
measure The interpretation of changes in these scores, however, remains the
same
One last point should be mentioned To enhance the reliability of the analysis,
infrequent miscellaneous offenses were excluded from it These offenses
occurred too infrequently to obtain reliable measures of their seriousness This
eliminated about 28 percent of the guilty plea cases, but 4038 still remained
for the analysis
is no significant difference between plea and trial cases in
terms of the proportion of cases receiving some charge
reduction or the magnitude of charge reductions.
"Knockdown" Patterns in Primary Charges
The magnitude of reductions ("knockdowns") in sentencing
exposure for defendants does not appear to be substantial
Count drops are common, but they usually focus on secondary
charges. The sentencing impact of these changes is corre-
spondingly limited, because second and third charges are
not translated into units of punishment equal in weight to
those of the primary charge, Most charge modifications, then,
subtract very little from a defendant's probable sentence
irrespective of what the penalties of the dropped or reduced
charges may be in the criminal code. If more than symbolic
alterations occur, the primary charge or major offense clearly
must be changed. However, only about 15 percent of the
cases had such changes Although they are relatively rare
events, there is merit in looking at what happens when
primary charges are reduced to see if there is any pattern
to the reductions and whether they are concentrated in a
handful of charges. The analysis is again restricted to the
basic types of offenses handled in the courts
A relatively small number of charges were subject to
knockdowns. The seven primary offenses listed in the first
column of Table 5 accounted for 68 percent of all knockdowns
in the pooled sample of cases. That the reductions were
guided by fairly clear-cut decision rules is made clear by the
fact that the reduced charges listed in the fourth column
amounted to nearly half (45.6%) of all knockdown charges.
In other words, when changes in primary charges took place,
the odds were good that the offense was one of those listed
in this table and that the charge to which it was reduced
involved one of those arrayed in the "knockdown" column of
the table Reductions in primary charges, however, tended to
concentrate in two charge categories — burglary and aggra-
vated battery. Over 40 percent (44.1 percent) of all knock-
downs occurred in cases with these charges. While serious,
these offenses are not in the same league as murder, rape,
and armed robbery which altogether accounted for about 16
percent of the knockdowns (134 cases in total). With the
exception of theft and possession of hard drug cases, the
other charges were more likely to lead to a conviction on
reduced charges than what might be expected given their
representation in the total pool of cases.
GOING RATES AND GUILTY PLEAS
Count modifications, and to a lesser extent changes in primary
charges, occurred with some regularity in the courts, but
their impact on sentencing was marginal at best. Reductions
Table 5
COMMON KNOCKDOWN CHARGES
(from arrest to trial court disposition)
Original primary
charge at arrest
Percentage of all
Table 6
THE DISTRIBUTION OF SENTENCING CLUSTERS
BY MODE OF CONVICTION
Type of Sentencing
Cluster
Percentage of
Qualifying
Guilty Plea Cases*
Percentage of
Qualifying Trial
Conviction Cases*
Probation
Cluster
Between
Probation and
Low Cluster
Low Cluster
Between Low
Cluster and
High Cluster
High Cluster
Above High
Cluster
No Cluster
Above Probation
658
(2759)
7.4
(302)
11.1
(457)
7.3
(298)
2.6
(106)
2.5
(104)
38
(155)
38 7
(91)
11.9
(28)
11 9
(28)
21 7
(51)
1 7
(4)
60
(14)
8.1
(19)
Total 1000
(4181)
100
(235)
' These data exclude 1072 cases involving convictions of non-regular offenses
(i.e., not one of the 13 offenses discussed in the text)
process. The first column of Table 6 presents the data on
this question for defendants who pleaded guilty.
When the three major clusters are combined, they include
79 percent of the guilty plea cases. Going rates clearly play
a prominent role in determining sentences in guilty plea
cases. The fact that the probation cluster had 65.3 percent
of the cases does not diminish the significance of these
findings; the simple reality is that many felony cases involve
first offenders or people convicted of routine crimes who
receive minimal punishment. What is not apparent from this
table is that proportionately fewer cases are located in clusters
as the charges mount in seriousness and hence sentencing
latitude The correlation between offense seriousness and
being in a cluster is - 29, indicating that sentence bargaining
is concentrated in the more serious cases.
Are the sentencing norms represented by these clusters
as effective in constraining sentencing after a trial conviction?
The short answer is No. While nearly 79 percent of the plea
cases fell within one cluster or another, only 52.3 percent of
the trial cases did, a difference that is statistically significant
well beyond the .001 level As the second column of Table 6
indicates, the probation cluster includes proportionately fewer
cases and the "off-cluster" categories include more, raising
the possibility of a trial penalty that moves defendants who
fail to plead guilty "up a notch" in the sentencing hierarchy.
Table 6 suggests that sentencing is dominated by a small
handful of going rates for a specific offense, but it cannot
reveal whether the pigeonholing process was consistent The
assignment of going rates to defendants could be distorted
by bartering or capriciousness An examination of the criminal
records of the defendants in various clusters provides some
insight into the consistency of this assignment procedure. To
do this a trichotomized criminal record variable was con-
structed About half of the defendants were first offenders,
and these were assigned a separate category. The remaining
half were divided roughly in half based on whether they had
less serious or more serious records This variable was then
Table 7
THE COMPOSITION OF SENTENCE CATEGORIES BY
DEFENDANT'S PRIOR RECORD
(guilty plea cases only)
Probation
Cluster
Low Cluster
High Cluster
assignment was heavily influenced by the defendant's criminal
record.
While one could develop the implications of these findings
along severaMmes, two seem most fruitful. The first concerns
our understanding of the dispositional process. Perhaps the
most obvious implication here is that while the concessions
model may explain an important fragment of the guilty plea
process, it is but a fragment. The consensus model provides
a more realistic perspective from which to explain how routine
policies and courthouse culture shape the guilty plea process.
However, the two are not mutually exclusive.
Equally important are the policy implications of these find-
ings. They speak to those who would abolish plea bargaining
and replace it with some modified trial form, such as prevailed
in the United States in the mid-nineteenth century or as
presently exists in some West European systems.
The data suggest that the costs of a plea oriented dispo-
sitional process are not as great as many had earlier pre-
sumed. Many felony cases involve mundane situations which
are currently handled in a routinized, consistent manner. To
dispose of these cases by means of a trial would lead to the
demise of the trial as we now know it. To accommodate the
increased flow of cases would inevitably entail many modifi-
cations in trial procedure, some of which may not be salutary.
More importantly, the large volume of "undisputed disputes"
would dull the sensitivities of those charged with the respon-
sibility of conducting trials. Ultimately trials could become
less effective in cases where they are most needed.
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